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Introduction
Political misdeeds have a significant place in the history of the state of Arkansas.
Whether it be the early days of Arkansas’s Statehood in which accounts read more like tales of
the wild west, with legislators racing their horses up the stairs of the old State House, or even the
recent indictments of six state legislators, one of which was Jeremy Hutchinson, the nephew of
Governor Asa Hutchinson, there are a number of cases that are exemplary of Arkansas’s
relationship with corruption. This is not an exhaustive list by any means, and instances like this
litter Arkansas’s history predating its recognition as a state in 1836.
During one of the first meetings of the General Assembly, Speaker of the House John
Wilson murdered his fellow Representative Joseph J. Anthony with his Bowie knife on the floor
of the Old State House in a duel that began when Wilson thought Anthony slighted him in a
speech over a bill concerning wolf pelts.1 This primitive nature of the period of early statehood
was also reflected in the way power was exercised by its early leaders. The dynasty made up of
the Conway, Johnson, Sevier, and Rector families accounted for almost 200 years in a variety of
elected positions in early Arkansas and managed to leave the state with a massive $3 million debt
and a distrust of public officials amongst the constituency that would last long after they were
gone.2 These issues that built up during the state’s early period are universally agreed upon to
have been detrimental to progress, but these issues from the past have largely been ignored and
left to be fixed by the passing of time.
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Jeanne Lewis, “Pages from the Past: 1837,” Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 23 May 2019, 7A.
Diane D. Blair and Jay Barth, Arkansas Politics and Government, 2d ed. (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 8.
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In the early 20th century, a prosecutor named Lewis Rhoton noticed the corruption that
was occurring in the state legislature and took it head on. The unraveling of the state’s largest
corruption scandal began with Rhoton’s decision to investigate the 1905 session of the Arkansas
General Assembly after charges of corruption had been raised for the past decade. Reports
indicated that Thomas L. Cox, who was the state’s most powerful corporate lobbyist,
representing Western Union Telegraph Company, Southwestern Telephone Company, and many
other corporate agencies, had bribed state officials for years. According to reports, many
legislators were openly given elaborate gifts like fine whiskey and cash to pursue the interests of
wealthy businessmen. Cox gave certain legislators gifts up to $1500 at each session and often
gave out loans to other prominent officials. Rhoton’s efforts helped secure indictments against
sixteen state senators and representatives, one mayor and three other individuals, and the
Arkansas Senate’s expulsion of a member who confessed to taking bribes. Ultimately, Rhoton
was unsuccessful in indicting his main target of Alonzo Webb Covington, who he saw as the
largest perpetrator in the ring but remained relentless in his pursuit of exposing political
corruption. Rhoton earned a reputation as a hero among Arkansans and helped usher in the
state’s first truly progressive governor in George W. Donaghey, but the effect on corruption in
the long term was insignificant.3
Flash forward to the recent history, and the reports of misdeeds in Arkansas politics still
remain. In 2017, a large scandal revolving around the General Improvement Fund garnered
national attention after Representative Micah Neal pleaded guilty to receiving kickbacks for
directing grants toward Springdale’s Ecclesia College and Bentonville’s nonprofit Preferred
Family Healthcare. This led to the conviction of six legislators, including Jeremy Hutchinson, the
James F. Willis, “Lewis Rhoton and the ‘Boodlers’: Political Corruption and Reform during Arkansas’s
Progressive Era,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 76, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 95-124.
3
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nephew of Governor Asa Hutchinson.4 Arkansas has attempted to curb corruption with things
like ethics commissions and review boards, but whether any efforts have proven successful
remain up for debate. Duane Kees, former U.S. attorney for the Western District of Arkansas,
exemplifies this best when he said of the General Improvement Fund Scandal: “Those in Little
Rock will walk the straight and narrow for about 10 years… 15 years from now, there’ll be
nobody left in Little Rock to remember this. They will have forgotten the lesson, so it’ll be a
different scheme, but I think it’ll happen again.”5
Through reviewing the existing scholarly literature on corruption, factors that seem to
increase the likelihood or contribute to rising numbers in reported cases of corruption will be
used to determine which factors are most highly correlated with the amount of reported public
corruption in a state’s government. With this, one will gain knowledge on which states have the
highest levels of reported corruption and what factors are present in the state that can help
explain the high levels of corruption. This combination of relationships will answer the question
as to what a state should look for to address issues related to political misdeeds. With that being
said, we can examine where Arkansas falls with respect to general corruption level rankings
compared to other states in the nation and assess the presence of multiple factors that may
contribute to increasing the likelihood of higher numbers of reported corruption within the state.

Literature Review
The current state of research on corruption reveals many different explanations as to the
resulting negative effects on a population, but fewer studies have been conducted to pinpoint the

Ron Wood and Doug Thompson, “GIF kickbacks cases still grinding through courts,” Arkansas
Democrat Gazette, 22 November 2020, 8A.
5
Wood and Thompson, 8A.
4
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contributing factors of corruption. In this study, the levels of corruption in each American state
government will be examined. However, the data compiled in this literature review looks far
beyond the borders of the United States to attempt to gain the most complete understanding of
what causes public corruption. By taking a comparative approach of applying studies done on
governments in other countries to the research regarding governments in the American states,
one can begin to paint a picture of why corruption may occur.
Multiple specific contributing factors of corruption have been identified by researchers,
but the majority of findings and hypotheses can be condensed into five main categories. Factors
related to the general size of the government, such as the presence and amount of policy or the
presence of oversight committees to curb corruption, were mentioned the most in the body of
research. The levels of professionalism in a legislature, which is usually measured by legislative
salaries, the number of days spent in legislative session, and the number of staff members each
state legislator has, was also commonly hypothesized to have a negative effect on corruption, and
hypotheses related to demographics of populations, such as education, income, and diversity,
were far less common.
“Big” Government
To classify a government as a “big” government is a difficult task made easy by the
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, which can be used to measure and compare the size
and scope of the governments of each U.S. state. Dincer and Gunalp use this Index to show that
states with more regulations and institutions ironically do a poor job at regulating corruption
within its departments. They find that the association between reported corruption and a high
number of federal regulations is statistically significant. According to their study, an increase by
one standard deviation in the Fraser Freedom Index is equal to an increase of a half standard
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deviation in the Corruption Convictions Index.6 Basically, any increase in the amount of
government regulation or oversight resulted in an increase in the number of officials convicted of
federal public corruption charges.
Other research studies have backed up the findings of the Fraser Index. Dincer and
Gunalp explain that this can be attributed to the idea that with more red tape, there is an
opportunity to create even more. They explain that there are “direct and indirect mechanisms
through which regulations cause corruption”7 which allow for public officials to extract personal
gain through corrupt practices. This goes hand in hand with work done by Bologna in which she
identifies a connection between corruption and high levels of competition. Her reasoning is that
more government regulations and departments create opportunities to create either mutually or
individually beneficial business opportunities through government outsourcing, such as
contracting. Thus, the competition between businesses or individuals to secure the contracts
leads to increased opportunities for someone to partake in corrupt practices,8 and there are
countless examples of this that we can observe. It also makes sense that the accountability
mechanisms would begin to get lost in an ever-expanding sea of red tape. Dimant and Tosato
summarize this the best when they explain that the creation of “regulations and authorizations”
creates a monopoly on power that lies in the hands of the officials who supervise the activity.
They also link the creation of more regulations to more opportunities for government officials to
interact with people in the public sector, which they identify as an increase in the opportunities
for someone to partake in corrupt activity9 (e.g., accepting kickbacks or bribes in exchange for

Oguzhan Dincer and Burak Gunalp, “The Effects of Federal Regulations on Corruption in U.S. States.”
European Journal of Political Economy 65, (December 2020).
7
Dincer and Gunalp.
8
Jamie Bologna, “Corruption, Product Market Competition, and Institutional Quality: Empirical
Evidence from the U.S. States,” Economic Inquiry 50, no. 1 (2016).
9
Dimant and Tosato.
6

8

lucrative contracts). Bologna, Dincer, and Gunalp define these governments with excessive and
cumbersome regulations as “low quality institutions” and explain that the problems created by
having many regulations and departments can lead to lower institutional quality.
Another byproduct of big government is that with more regulations, departments,
authorizations, etc., it inevitably becomes much harder for citizens within the population to hold
officials accountable due to the vast size and scope of the institution itself. There will also be
much less transparency due to the size of the government, for the simple fact that it would take
the most dedicated members of a constituency to keep tabs on everything that goes on within an
overgrown, complex, and subsequently inefficient bureaucracy. For a corrupt public official, this
would only be seen as another opportunity to capitalize and cash in on the system. There are
conflicting reports about whether or not federal regulations are helpful in limiting growth or
lessening corruption in an already large state government, but a method that has shown to be
unsuccessful more often than not is watchdog organizations or boards that are created to keep
public figures accountable. Many states have tried this strategy, but to no avail.10
In a comparative study that looked at ethics commissions and regulations put in place to
limit corrupt governance in both Jalisco, Mexico, and Arkansas, similar findings were reported
that can best be categorized with a few conclusions about what occurs when new regulations are
put in place to curb corruption. First, reform in the form of policy or ethics commissions are
usually the result of long-standing public distrust and frustration, but the specific variables that
lead to the introduction of such policies are highly unpredictable. In addition, when policies are
put in place by government officials, they are mostly symbolic in nature and created to “protect
as much of their autonomy as possible from public scrutiny and oversight.” These mostly

10

William D. Eggers, “Transforming Arkansas Government,” Policy Review 88, (March/April 1998): 10.
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symbolic reforms have two possible outcomes according to the literature; they either result in
more public distrust and frustration, or they eventually evolve into bureaucratic organizations
that actually lead the charge for active reform. However, the following can result in a complex
system that could potentially lead to repeated violations because officials are not properly
educated on all of the rules.11
In summary, most studies indicate that a good place to start in decreasing the likelihood
of corruption is to reduce the size of the government at the state level.12 The optimal approach at
limiting corruption seems to be found in the hands of the people who live in a democratic
society.
Legislative Professionalism
Due to the lack of uniformity among each of the fifty individual state governments that
collectively make up the United States, there are vast and easily observable differences in the
laws and regulations that dictate how each state’s legislature operates. Legislative
professionalism is one of these differences that can be measured and observed in a variety of
ways and has been hypothesized to be a factor in determining the likelihood for corruption in a
government. According to Peverill Squire’s Squire Index, legislative professionalism is
predominantly based upon three major components. These are salary and benefits, time demands
of service, and staff and resources allocated.13
In “The Merit of Meritiocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional
Deterrents of Corruption,” Carl Dahlstrom argues that a more professionalized legislature is less

Jeffrey J. Ryan, Jorge A. Alatorre, and William D. Schreckhise, “A Comparative Case Study of State
Ethics Reform in Jalisco and Arkansas.” Public Integrity 8, no. 4: 362-363.
12
Dincer and Gunalp.
13
Peverill Squire, “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited,” State
Politics & Policy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (Summer 2007).
11
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likely to be corrupt because professionalized state legislatures usually possess many of the same
attributes as what one would expect to see in a long-standing and highly developed democracy.
Some of these have been discussed in some capacity as their own subcategory for being an
indicator of corruption, such as a widely read press as well as diversity in the lawmaking bodies,
but Dahlstrom also analyzes the relationship between corruption and other factors that relate to
professionalism, like “bureaucratic factors, such as public employees’ competitive salaries,
career stability, or internal promotion.”14 In theory, a highly professionalized state government is
less likely to be corrupt because it provides less motivation for legislators to partake in
corruption for personal gain.
Another aspect of political corruption that can be closely linked to the issue of legislative
professionalism is greed. Greed was identified in the literature to be a component that arises as a
result of politicians advocating for their own personal gain. Charles Funderburk notes that
“traditional techniques of political corruption involving the use of public office and political
influence for personal enrichment are motivated primarily by venality and greed.”15 Aspects of
greed were certainly reported in the state of Arkansas where, for instance, six legislators were
convicted of corruption charges for receiving kickbacks in a large scandal involving the state’s
General Improvement Fund and later its Medicaid Program.16 However, individual greed being
the most significant contributor to political corruption is much less common in the modern era. It
has already been argued that the expansion of the federal government is likely to increase
corruption, but this instance when combined with a less professional legislature is perhaps the

Carl Dahlstrom, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell, “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics,
Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption,” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 3
(September 2012): 657.
15
Charles Funderburk, Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective: Sources, Status, and Prospects
(London: Routledge, 2016).
16
Wood and Thompson, 8A.
14
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one exception. Large party machines such as New York’s Tammany Hall used to have many
resources in which they could use to manipulate a system that was almost like the wild west
compared to the state political systems of today. With the expansion of social welfare and social
service agencies during the New Deal as well as the mass migration to suburbia following World
War II, the large urban party machines that existed in cities, like Tammany Hall or Lewis
Rhoton’s “Boodlers,” lost the immense influence that they held prior to these programs. With
that major transition, corruption based on greed, such as bribery, extortion, and kickbacks,
became much less of a widespread ordeal and moved more towards what we can observe in the
modern day: a set of individuals who seek to gain personal benefit rather than the whole of their
party organization.17
How does one go about measuring professionalism in a state legislature? There are many
factors that can be linked to professionalism, and therefore there are different ways to measure
professionalism. For instance, one factor worth considering when examining legislative
professionalism are the laws drafted by a particular state legislature. A professionalized
legislature should be expected to pass unique and innovative policies that are a clear reflection of
public opinion in the state that also hold up under a test of constitutionality under scrutiny by the
U.S. Supreme Court.18 However, by using public opinion and the numbers of laws struck down
serving as indicators of what should be produced by a professional legislature, we still do not
know the specific qualities that make one legislature more professional than the rest. The Squire
Index was created for this exact purpose; it determines legislative professionalism based upon
the aforementioned major components. These are salary and benefits, time demands of service,

17

Funderburk.
Susan M. Miller, Eve. M. Ringsmuth, and Joshua M. Little, “Pushing Constitutional Limits in the U.S.
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Politics and Policy Quarterly 15, no. 4 (December 2015).
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and staff and resources allocated.19 By measuring these, one can measure how professional a
state legislature is when compared to others, and the data collected by this can be compared to
the corruption rate of a state.
Many studies offer the hypothesis that legislatures that are more “professional” are less
likely to be corrupt. This is because individual actors within a professional legislature have less
motivation to be corrupt due to their compensation for doing their job well. Measuring the level
of professionalism across states is difficult due to its complexity, but multifaceted approaches
such as the Squire Index can be used to provide a comprehensive measurement to compare to
reports of corruption.
Political Education
For obvious reasons, political education makes a lot of sense when attempting to explain
high levels of reported corruption. However, to move in this direction it is first imperative to
outline a brief definition of what is meant by political education. Political education can be
defined as an individual’s capability to combine their knowledge of the political process and
current events to vote as informed citizens. For the purposes of this literature review however,
the definition for political education will be used as an umbrella term that covers a variety of
indicators of a functioning democratic society, all of which were gathered from scholarly
articles. These indicators include civic engagement measured by voter turnout in any particular
population, reported interest in state politics, and a general knowledge of issues facing the voter
base as well as knowledge regarding the democratic system and its mechanisms. When a
population group possesses some or many of these traits, the government that represents them is
less likely to be corrupt. This can best be explained with the theory that a voter base with a

19
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higher amount of politically educated citizens within their population will be more likely to hold
corrupt officials accountable by voting them out of office or by simply mobilizing to vote against
policies and legislation that could contribute or lead to corrupt practices.
Samuel Lipset hypothesizes that the average education levels of a population are the most
reliable indicator of whether or not the population is likely to be corrupt, and he largely makes
the claim that a population with higher levels of formal education will naturally be more
politically educated.20 The purpose of this section is not to dispute or confirm Lipset’s
hypothesis, but an intriguing argument can be made for lower education levels being a
contributing factor in and of itself in a corrupt society rather than whether or not we can equate
education with political education. Many scholars seem to think so. According to a study on the
dynamics between economic freedom and corruption in the United States, education is identified
as having a significant negative impact on corruption.21
While Lipset’s argument carries some merit, in analyzing voting behavior and political
activity there are a vast array of factors that can contribute to the political education of an
individual (e.g., how often they read the newspaper, membership in political organizations,
donations to campaigns, etc.). By using only education as a means of determining political
education, one would neglect this idea in favor of simplicity in gathering data. In the United
States, one of the main sources of political knowledge is the news. Research shows that in
countries with a free press, there is a better chance of higher voter participation as well as higher
chances at the removal of corrupt officials.22 These same outcomes can be attributed to the

20
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readers of a free press, and Dimant notes that “long exposure to democracy predicted lower
corruption.”23 Compante and Do agree that the press can help boost levels of political education
within a population, but they add that there is also a geographic variable that can impact political
involvement and education. In the United States, states that have very isolated capital cities and a
large spatial distribution of their population have been found to have less accountability
mechanisms on elected officials due to their isolation, and a population that is less interested in
politics by measures of voter participation.24
An important aspect of this that needs more review is the importance of the press and
political education in its relationship with corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2018,
Dimant linked education to contagion effects (an increase in corruption rates by 10% resulted in
an increase by 4%-11% in a neighboring state) and other factors that allowed for better access to
the state government, such as eGovernment.25 Many states were forced to revert to conducting
business over electronic platforms in 2020, and this is a problem with effects that deserve to be
studied in states, like Arkansas, with large amounts of their population generally having poor
access to broadband internet.
As stated, political education as an explanation for higher reported corruption rates
should be self-explanatory, as it directly effects the way in which people vote in elections.
Income Inequality
The conversation regarding how income inequality creates opportunities for corruption is
a very similar conversation to the ethnic diversity argument in the way that they effect ethnic
minorities’ participation in the political process. Alesina notes that the suspected causes of

23
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corruption being an issue that stems from income inequality is for the exact same reason as for
the ethnically diverse population; politicians have to “disguise” redistributive policies.
According to Alesina, public officials often use public employment as a redistributive device.
Statistics back this up, as city employment is “significantly higher in cities where income
inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher.”26 It has been discussed that we can link
corruption in the form of redistributive policies with ethnic diversity and income inequality.
It is also important to note that income inequality was reported in the literature, both by
Apergis and Alesina, as a derivative of per capita personal income combined with the
unemployment rate in a society, and both of these will likely hit minority populations in higher
proportions according to a study done by Apergis in which the results of how corruption affects
economic variables are examined across different demographics in the United States.27 Apergis
initially studied the association between corruption and income inequality in the United States in
2010 by using a test on data from statistics from U.S. Department of Justice which report the
number of officials from each state convicted on federal corruption charges. The results indicated
that there was “a long-run equilibrium relationship” between income inequality and corruption.
Income inequality was also found to have negative effects on other factors like unemployment,
but also corruption contributors that have been discussed already such as education.28 In the
study that covered every year from 1980 to 2004, the south was found the most corrupt region in
the United States, with approximately 0.35 convictions per 100,000 people. This would make
sense in terms of income inequality, as nine of the ten poorest states in the country are south of
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the Mason-Dixon line, with many of the remaining southern states not too far behind in the
rankings.29
Apergis would later confirm her findings in another study using a slightly different test.
Rather than the aforementioned test, a panel error correction model using data to measure the
effect of economic freedom on corruption in each U.S. State from the same time period used in
the previous study, and the results only confirmed what was unearthed two years prior: “per
capita income has a negative and statistically significant impact on corruption, whereas income
inequality has a positive and statistically significant impact.”30
Another factor that would have completed the case for income inequality was the failure
to mention that income inequality usually goes hand in hand with other factors that are not
strictly related to economics. Apergis identified that lower levels of education also had a
statistically significant impact on corruption, but it could be hypothesized that income inequality
has a statistically significant impact on the average education as well as the educational
opportunities within a society. We have already determined that education and political
education have a noteworthy impact on the likelihood of corruption, but education being an
unfortunate byproduct of income inequality would make for an interesting argument to say the
least.
Not only do higher levels of income inequality have potential negative effects on reports
of corruption, but income inequality within a state can also correlate with other factors that could
potentially influence reports of corruption.

Grant Suneson, “Wealth in America: Where are the Richest and Poorest States Based on Household
Income?” USA Today, 8 October 2018.
30
Apergis et al. (2012).
29
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Ethnic Diversity
As ethnic diversity increases in a population, the likelihood of corruption increases along
with it. This positive correlation can be explained for a various number of reasons. Primarily, the
more diverse a population is, the more it negatively impacts the economy and the institutional
efficiency of a society. Broadly speaking, this is due to the idea that as a constituency becomes
ethnically heterogeneous, voting will focus less on keeping elected officials accountable in terms
of honesty. Instead, it will likely focus more on resource and wealth distribution across the many
groups that exist within the population of the state.31 In a study that identified potential correlates
of higher reports of political corruption on an international scale, Paulo Mauro added that the risk
of corruption can only grow when ethnic diversity within a population is combined with greater
ethnolinguistic differences within the same population.32 Mauro’s study essentially shows that a
population that has greater diversity and cultural influence is more likely to have higher levels of
corruption. This is undoubtedly a difficult pill to swallow given that there are not many ways to
approach this problem. In the United States, it is generally not realistic to have the expectation
that a state’s legislative body will be composed of lawmakers that are a good representation of
the ethnic composition or the ethnolinguistic differences of any place, especially those that are
more diverse than average. Even if one were to comprise a legislative body that was a close
representation of the population, it would be highly unlikely for it to have the ability to cater to
all the different demographics, since no group would be able to possess a majority in the
legislative body. Along with this, elected officials in more ethnically diverse societies have

Edward L. Glaeser and Raven E. Saks, “Corruption in America,” Journal of Public Economics 90, no.
6-7 (August 2006).
32
Paulo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, (August 1995).
31
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shown a pattern of participating in corruption by “disguising” redistributive policies as
something more sinister that will ultimately benefit their ethnic background the most.33
In a study conducted on corruption climates in sub-Saharan Africa, a diverse ethnic
population was noted as the most significant contributor to a political climate that had high levels
of corruption.34 This relates back to the “scramble for Africa,” in which European powers
colonized the African continent and thus divided the continent amongst themselves. The way in
which the European countries ruled the African people had a severe impact on the indigenous
cultures in a way that would influence the distribution of power and governmental apparatuses
long after the European powers left.35 While this may seem like a problem that only faces
victims of European colonization, one could undoubtedly infer that a similar phenomenon can be
seen in the United States and particularly in the southern United States due to the many years of
enslavement endured by African Americans as well as the legal and social marginalization and
discrimination of African Americans and other minority groups. Like the groups discussed in
Parboteeah’s study on Sub-Saharan Africa, people who belong to different ethnic groups in the
United States, such as African Americans, American Indians, and people of Hispanic descent
will be less likely to fully integrate into the governmental process, and more likely to be
negatively affected by several factors that relate to corruption. This includes, but is not limited
to, what Parboteeah calls “socioeconomic crises” and “inequities in the distribution of power in a
multiethnic context.”36
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The ethnic diversity argument is only furthered by the argument that once an in-group, or
representatives of the majority in a population are in a position of power, they will do anything to
maintain their lock on leadership. With that being said, it can be observed that elected officials
who display corrupt behavior are still likely to maintain their position of power if they are a
member of that in-group.37 This not only contributes to corruption through a lack of
consequences that takes the form of punishment coming from the voters, but it also keeps smaller
ethnic groups out of power. This problem of holding different ethnicities out of power while
sacrificing integrity would likely be magnified as a population grows more diverse.
A diverse population is more likely to fall victim to corruption for a few reasons that have
been identified in prior research studies. A lack of representation in the government from
minority groups,38 in-group voting,39 and issues surrounding resource distribution40 all serve as
examples that support the idea that the ethnic diversity argument is a convincing one.

Methodology: Measuring Corruption and its Determinants
With the primary research question of this study being used to examine whether or not
the state of Arkansas has addressed from its history of misdeeds, one can shed light on this by
exploring the relationship that different factors hypothesized to be determining factors of
corruption have with the levels of corruption in each individual state. The goal of this section is
to twofold: (1) explain the datasets used to examine the factors identified in the literature that are

Eugen Dimant and Guglielmo Tosato, “Causes and Effects of Corruption: What has Past Decade’s
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known to increase the likelihood of corruption and (2) the association with two competing
dependent variables that we should expect to see in the results section.
Measuring the Dependent Variables:
Two primary dependent variables that measure corruption were used to interpret data in
this study, the first of which was based on a study done by Glaeser and Saks in which they
gathered data from the Department of Justice’s Report to Congress on the Activities and
Operations of the Public Integrity Section, which includes many different crimes that fall under
the umbrella of corruption, to find a corruption rate. The corruption rate was derived by using the
average number of federal corruption convictions from each state over three different years
(1989, 1999, and 2002), dividing that average by the state’s population, and multiplying it by
100,000 to configure the average annual convictions per 100,000 people, otherwise referred to as
corruption rate.41 For the purposes of this study, Glaeser and Saks’ method of finding corruption
rate was replicated to provide an updated, more current data set to compare the predicting
variables to. To do so, the information from the 2019 Report to Congress on the Activities and
Operations of the Public Integrity Section was used to find the ten-year average of each state’s
federal corruption convictions. Then, the ten-year average was divided by the population of each
state as provided by the most recent data from the census bureau and subsequently multiplied by
100,000, leaving us with the average annual convictions per 100,000 members of the population.
On a nationwide scale, the average of people convicted with a federal corruption charge from
2010-2019 was 0.284 in every 100,000 with a standard deviation of 0.203 convictions per
100,000.

Edward L. Glaeser and Raven E. Saks, “Corruption in America,” Journal of Public Economics 90, no.
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The other method of measuring corruption in this research is modeled based on studies
done by Glaeser and Goldin as well as Paulo Marco. In an effort to measure the most corrupt era
of American history between the years 1815 and 1975, Glaeser and Goldin searched words like
“corrupt,” “fraud,” and other similar words in newspaper databases and used the number of
results returned to hypothesize what period was the most corrupt.42 Similarly, Marco used word
counts in newspaper databases to create a dataset that suggested that violent death counts among
Italians were underreported during World War I and the start of Mussolini’s regime.43 For the
purpose of this study, a newspaper database search was used to create another dataset to compare
each state’s levels of corruption over a specific time period. In order to be somewhat consistent
with the other dataset, the years observed were 2010 to 2021. Similarly, to Glaeser and Goldin,
the search terms entered into the database were: the name of each state in the leading or first
paragraph, followed by the terms “fraud” and/or “corruption” in the leading or first paragraph, as
well as “state legislature” in the first paragraph in order to attempt to filter out any articles about
the national government. The NewsBank inc. database was used for this search, and while this
method has its limitations, as evidenced by the lack of large newspapers such as the New York
Times or Wall Street Journal in the NewsBank database, all of the searches were held constant
with the only differentiating factor being the names of each state included in the search. The
number of results that each search returned without any further adjustment were used as the
measure of corruption in the dataset.
With two dependent variables that indicate the levels of corruption that exist within a
state, we can then use both of these created datasets to compare with data that represents the five
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contributing factors of corruption from the current base of literature on corruption in the U.S. and
abroad. In theory, correlations should be fairly easy to describe within the data at a surface level
observation, but two ordinary least square regressions will be run for each of the five
independent variables, because of the two competing datasets on corruption. This should
describe the strength of each factor’s relationship, and these relationships can then be used to
determine what qualities might increase the risk for a corrupt state governance. This will also be
able to answer the research question of whether or not Arkansas has made improvements in
addressing previous state and local government corruption.
Measuring the Independent Variables:
“Big” Government
In this study, to measure big government essentially means to measure the size and scope
of a state government. To do so, one can measure how “big” a government is based on its score
on the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, as Dincer and Gunalp did in their study about
the effects of federal regulation on corruption on a nationwide scale. The same thing can be done
on the state level with the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index of North America 2020,
which measures the size of government by measuring government spending, taxes, and labor
market freedom. In Dincer and Gunalp’s study, they found that each increase of a standard
deviation increase in the freedom index was equal to an increase of about half a standard
deviation in their dataset that also used convictions as a means to measure corruption.44 With
that, we can expect to see a positive relationship between the economic freedom statistic and the
corruption rate and newspaper count.
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Legislative Professionalism
Professionalism in the 50 legislative bodies that make up the United States can be
measured best by Peverill Squire’s method. Squire argues that the two most important qualities
in determining the level of professionalism in a legislature are the salaries, number of staff,
resources allocated, and days spent in session, and he created the Squire Index to condense these
factors into a single professionalism score that assesses “the capacity of both legislators and
legislatures to generate and digest information in the policymaking process.45” For the eight
states that do not pay legislators an annual salary, Squire found a way to normalize the data. For
Maine, who pays a higher salary in the first year than in the second year of a legislature, the
salaries were averaged. The remaining seven states pay per diems, including one that pays a
weekly wage, Squire calculated the salary for the number of days or weeks that the legislature
was in regular session.46 It is also important to note that the Squire Index includes uncorrected
and corrected measures and rankings. Aside from the score of Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania, who produced large discrepancies in the data due to their days spent in
legislative session, the discrepancies in the data are mostly minimal. For these reasons, the
corrected measure was used as the dataset.
Political Education
From research about political education’s relationship with corruption, we learn that there
are plenty of ways to gauge how politically educated a population may be. As discussed in the
literature review, civic engagement, voter turnout, reported interest in state politics, knowledge
of issues facing the voter base, and familiarity with the democratic system and its mechanisms
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are all signs of a politically educated population. For the sake of simplicity in the research,
education statistics will be used as a measurement of political education in accordance with
Lipset’s argument that higher education levels within a population will naturally correspond with
higher levels of political education.47 To measure education levels in a state, high school
graduation rates from the National Center for Education Statistics were collected. While there are
differences in every state’s curriculum, most states require their public schools to have a social
studies curriculum for students that includes at least a semester-long course in civics. If the
research hypothesis is supported, we should expect to see a negative correlation between
graduation rates from high school with both corruption rate and newspaper count.
Income Inequality
Due to the complexity of income inequality as a factor, multiple datasets that measure
income inequality could have been used as independent variables for comparison to corruption
rate and newspaper count. Apergis and Alesina both noted that income inequality was a
derivative of the unemployment rate and median income in a society. The unemployment rate
collected from statistics published by the United States Board of Labor measures unemployment
rate as a measure of the unemployed portion of the civilian labor force, which is a sum of all
employed and unemployed individuals estimated from data that they gathered from the United
States Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. The numbers used in this report from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics are updated monthly, and the last reported data was collected in
September of 2021.48 However, the dataset used for this study will be the Gini Coefficient. The
United States Census Bureau defines the Gini Index as a summary measure of income inequality.
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It summarizes the distribution of income in a society on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning that
everybody in the population receives the same income, and 1 meaning that only one member of
the population/one group within the population receives all of the income.49 In this study, the
numbers were multiplied by 100 and given as a percent rather than a number between zero and
one.
Ethnic Diversity
Parboteaeah found that in sub-Saharan African nations, corruption was positively
correlated with higher levels of ethnic diversity. In order to measure ethnic diversity within a
U.S. state, this study will use the United States Census Bureau’s diffusion score, which is a
statistic that measures the combined percentage of all racial and ethnic groups that are not in the
top three most populous racial/ethnic groups within a state. In the United States, the top three
minority groups are identified as White alone non-Hispanic (57.8% of the population), Hispanic
or Latino (18.7% of the population), and Black or African American (12.1%) as of the 2020
census. The breakdown of the remaining 11.4% of the ethnic makeup of the population of U.S.
states can be used to determine how diverse the population is. A higher diffusion score means
that the population is less concentrated within the top three race groups and more “diffused”
throughout other ethnic groups.50 If the research hypotheses regarding ethnic diversity as having
a causal relationship with corruption are correct, then we would expect that states with high
diffusion rates to also have a high corruption rate as well as a high newspaper count.
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Results
This section begins with describing and showing the datasets for the fifty states and both
of their corresponding scores for corruption rate and newspaper count. After this, the
relationships between each independent variable, the contributing factors of corruption, and the
two dependent variable datasets will be analyzed.
As mentioned, some of the data is derived from Glaeser and Saks’ method of configuring
a “corruption rate” in their empirical study, “Corruption in America,” in which corruption data
from the Department of Justice’s Report to Congress on the Activities of the Public Integrity
Section51 was used. Table 1 was created using a formula identical to the one used by Glaeser and
Saks to determine the number of federal corruption convictions per 100,000 residents in a state
over a ten-year span from 2010 to 2019. Across the United States, there was an average of about
0.28 people convicted for corruption which corresponds exactly with Glaeser and Saks average
of data that they collected from 1976 to 2002. However, in this dataset, there is a much greater
degree of variation across states with a standard deviation of 0.20 compared to the 0.13 standard
deviation in the Glaeser and Saks study.
There are many crimes that constitute being labeled as corruption. In the Report to
Congress on the Activities of the Public Integrity Section, the Department of Justice lists the
number of federal, state, and local officials who were convicted of crimes like fraud, obstructions
of justice, conflict of interest, and campaign finance violations. The 2019 edition of this report
specifically notes that election offenses, such as election fraud and or ballot fraud, are covered in
these numbers as well. According to the report, there was a total of 19,303 federal, state, or local
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officials, and private citizens involved in public corruption offenses over the ten-year span in
which the data was collected, with federal officials accounting for over 7,500 of that total.52
Table 1 is the database of the number of federal corruption convictions per 100,000 residents for
every state over the span of 2010-2019. The higher the score, the higher the corruption rate.
Table 1:
Corruption Rate of U.S. States

Montana
South Dakota
Maryland
West Virginia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Virginia
Oklahoma
Mississippi
Alaska
Georgia
Arkansas
New Jersey
Alabama
Pennsylvania
Arizona
Tennessee
Illinois
Texas
Nebraska
Rhode Island
Missouri
Massachusetts
Florida
New Mexico

52

1.198
0.803
0.582
0.530
0.513
0.497
0.491
0.488
0.417
0.396
0.355
0.347
0.341
0.332
0.327
0.324
0.315
0.296
0.289
0.284
0.283
0.275
0.271
0.270
0.258

North Dakota
New York
Michigan
Vermont
Indiana
Wyoming
Ohio
Kansas
Idaho
Maine
Delaware
California
Iowa
Hawaii
Wisconsin
Connecticut
North Carolina
Washington
Nevada
South Carolina
Minnesota
Colorado
Oregon
Utah
New Hampshire
National Average*

0.249
0.231
0.226
0.224
0.217
0.207
0.207
0.206
0.173
0.164
0.164
0.164
0.162
0.162
0.156
0.126
0.126
0.105
0.104
0.103
0.083
0.076
0.062
0.037
0.030
0.284

United States Department of Justice. Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of
the Public Integrity Section for 2019. Public Integrity Section: Criminal Division.
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The second method of measuring the levels of conviction in each of the American states
is derived from a Glaeser and Goldin study that used the number of results returned in a variety
of newspaper databases from searching for terms related to corruption. Glaeser and Goldin’s
study sought to pinpoint the most corrupt eras and regions throughout the United States, but in
this study their efforts are replicated to provide another database for corruption levels, or at the
very least the media’s perception of corruption within a state. Other studies have also used
similar methods. Marco created a similar database that involved newspaper database searches
and their results to prove that the deaths of Italians during Mussolini’s rise to power was
underreported.53
To replicate the efforts of studies like those conducted by Marco and Glaeser and Goldin
to determine a rate or amount of corruption in an American state, a few fundamental changes can
be seen when compared to the datasets in other studies. For starters, the date range was not as
long as the Glaeser and Goldin study. Similarly, to Marco’s study, an intentional and relatively
short date range was selected. This was done to correspond closely with the years analyzed in the
Department of Justice’s report to Congress. To be consistent with the corruption rate dataset, the
years set for the filter in the newspaper database were 2010 to present. Most importantly, the
names of the different states were included in each search so that the number of results could be
individualized in order to create a dataset in which each state was represented.
Also, it is important to emphasize that the newspaper count was taken directly from the
results returned, without any norming per population as was done with the corruption rate data.
This was done in order to keep the results consistent with the data returned in Glaeser and
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Goldin’s study. Table 2 represents the dataset of newspaper count, which counts the number of
times words relating to corruption were found in relation to a state in a newspaper.

Table 2:
Newspaper Count for U.S. States

New York
Florida
Texas
California
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Virginia
North Carolina
Michigan
New Jersey
Illinois
Georgia
Iowa
Kansas
Arizona
Indiana
Wisconsin
Missouri
Massachusetts
Alabama
Arkansas
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Colorado

12062
7342
6572
6042
4274
3733
3637
3612
3397
3245
3237
3129
2830
2498
2291
2234
2230
2106
2088
2029
1960
1951
1807
1741
1704

Mississippi
Louisiana
Maryland
Minnesota
Utah
Vermont
Kentucky
Maine
South Carolina
Nevada
West Virginia
New Hampshire
Oregon
New Mexico
Delaware
Idaho
Rhode Island
Nebraska
Montana
Alaska
Washington
North Dakota
Hawaii
Wyoming
South Dakota
National Average*

1619
1612
1610
1599
1559
1541
1504
1446
1441
1437
1429
1364
1357
1295
1259
1196
1073
1060
1014
943
912
878
776
766
712
2383

Before comparing these two datasets to statistics that correspond with the contributing
factors of corruption and conducting a multivariate regression analysis to determine the strength
of these variables, there are a few issues with the dataset that are worth mentioning. The largest
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problem in these datasets can be found in the configuration of the corruption rate statistic. By
using the number of convictions or cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice as a measure
of corruption, one runs into the problem of measuring system capacity or system overload of the
federal court system rather than the actual levels of corruption in a state. Alt and Lassen explain
that using statistics like these are usually a good place to start in measuring corruption, but they
theorize that “white-collar crimes, including corruption, are insufficiently prosecuted “due to
many states having a strain on their prosecutorial resources, which in turn means that states with
greater resources “result in more convictions” and vice versa.54” However, these are quite
possibly the best statistics that we have to tally corruption for the purposes of this study. For that
reason, the data should not be considered illegitimate, but it is important to keep this in mind
when examining the results.
In regard to the newspaper count statistics, it goes without saying that this measurement
of corruption is not foolproof. It is practically impossible to get a completely accurate count
given the sheer number of publications that exist and the inability to gather them from a singular
database. It is also worth noting that in Glaeser and Goldin’s study, a variety of databases were
used to conduct the search and a vetting process was used to eliminate any repeated articles and
stories that weren’t actually about corruption. In this research, the Newsbank database was the
only one used and there was no vetting process; the results were recorded verbatim.
To determine the strength of the relationship between the five independent variables
compared to corruption rate and newspaper count, two separate multivariate regressions were
conducted to determine a correlation between the five determinants and each dependent variable.
The complete dataset of the numbers from every state that represent each independent variable
James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, “Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from the
American States,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30, no. 2 (May 2014).
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(big government, legislative professionalism, political education, income inequality, and ethnic
diversity) can be found below in Table 3.

Table 3:
Complete Dataset for U.S. States

State
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ

Big
Government
4.67
5.71
6.14
6.57
4.71
6.49
6.45
5.51
7.73
7.27
5.12
6.23
7.04
5.96
7.08
6.86
5.45
6.41
6.69
6.57
5.58
6.00
5.44
6.92
5.38
6.29
6.95
6.88
6.75
7.84
5.99

Legislative
Professionalism
0.296
0.175
0.207
0.264
0.629
0.268
0.267
0.203
0.245
0.149
0.321
0.241
0.169
0.294
0.156
0.181
0.162
0.187
0.431
0.278
0.154
0.401
0.204
0.243
0.161
0.116
0.238
0.112
0.230
0.048
0.233

Political
Education
80
92
88
78
85
81
89
89
87
82
85
92
81
86
87
87
91
80
88
87
87
81
84
90
85
87
87
88
88
88
91

Income
Inequality
41.74
47.69
47.00
46.82
49.00
45.90
49.00
45.00
49.00
48.16
43.69
44.00
44.57
48.00
44.94
45.55
47.41
49.03
48.26
45.13
45.00
46.00
44.90
46.32
48.00
45.87
47.48
46.00
44.20
43.44
47.82

Ethnic
Diversity
17.9
6.0
8.0
11.5
10.8
8.5
9.5
9.4
7.5
8.9
21.8
6.5
3.9
9.6
7.0
9.2
6.1
6.1
12.6
12.0
4.0
8.5
10.8
8.0
4.7
5.9
8.6
9.3
7.5
4.6
14.2
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NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
Nat’l Avg*

5.37
6.54
4.25
5.75
7.05
5.17
6.48
5.23
6.11
7.28
7.55
7.61
6.73
7.62
5.08
5.97
6.58
4.50
6.72
6.24

0.140
0.182
0.430
0.384
0.229
0.417
0.417
0.200
0.156
0.103
0.136
0.234
0.115
0.178
0.178
0.272
0.204
0.157
0.081
0.229

75
84
83
82
85
80
87
84
81
84
91
90
87
88
85
81
90
91
82
86

48.00
45.00
51.02
46.41
46.52
46.00
46.80
47.38
46.90
44.00
47.86
48.03
43.00
46.73
44.00
45.60
44.00
46.21
43.00
46.22

6.9
16.0
14.3
7.3
17.8
8.3
7.9
9.6
6.2
7.6
6.5
9.2
9.2
12.6
3.9
13.0
7.6
3.2
4.2
9.0

Table 4 represents the results of both multivariate regression analyses of the five most
significant factors in determining corruption. The first column represents the data in relation to
the corruption rate, while the second column represents the data in relation to the numbers
produced by the newspaper count. The null hypothesis for the regression analyses can read as
follows: there is no relationship between a rise in the levels of corruption in a state and an
increase in government size and structure, legislative professionalism, levels of political
education, income inequality, and diversity. For this study, the threshold of significance for the
p-values returned is set at p < 0.10. A value in the table less than that equates to stronger
evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected, while the inverse means that the research
hypothesis was not supported.
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Table 4:
Regression Results for Corruption Rate and Newspaper Count

Corruption Rate

Newspaper Count

Big Government

0.6665
(0.0364)

0.3415
(271.7695)

Professionalism

0.0913†
(0.3452)

0.0056**
(2573.2564)

Political Education

0.5453
(0.0076)

0.3787
(57.1747)

Income Inequality

0.1836
(0.0165)

0.0003**
(123.4677)

Diversity

0.6541
(0.0083)

0.9100
(62.3934)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
The corruption rate column uses the data from Table 1, while the newspaper count column uses
the data from Table 2.
†p < 0.10

*p < 0.05

**p < 0.01

Turning first to the data from the corruption rate column, we see that only one variable,
legislative professionalism, had a statistically significant relationship with the corruption rate,
suggesting that higher levels of professionalism in state governments lead to higher corruption
rates. It is also worth noting that even with the statistical insignificance that a p-value of 0.0913
suggests, it was the only variable that lay within the threshold of significance by a wide margin.
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The next closet variable, income inequality, more than doubled the value of professionalism.
With this, we can conclude that none of the rest of the independent variables are significant
correlates of high corruption rates.
The newspaper count column produced some informative results in regard to the strength
of evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Income inequality and professionalism were found to
have significant relationships with this particular measure of corruption levels with both
returning a p-value well under 0.01. This shows that high levels of legislative professionalism
and more income inequality were found to result in higher levels of corruption. Interestingly
enough, the two independent variables with the strongest correlation to their respective
measurements of corruption were the same in both columns: legislative professionalism and
income inequality.
These results give us more questions than answers. A reasonable expectation would have
been to see more variables have stronger correlations with either dependent variable given the
existing literature on the causes of corruption. However, there are many reasons as to why the
results were not quite on par with what was expected. The first reason is that corruption is simply
difficult to measure in an objective way. The corruption rate measure is a perfect example of this.
While it is perhaps the most objective measurement of corruption due to the fact that it is based
on real and measurable data, the data itself makes it difficult to see the entire picture. The
corruption rate is derived from the Department of Justice’s crime reports. This may be a great
place to start in measuring corruption, but a critique of this means of measurement is that it is a
more accurate measurement of the system capacity of the federal court system in each state
rather than the actual corruption rate. Alt and Lassen apply the criminological theories of system
capacity and system overload as a critique of the use of these statistics as the only dependent
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variable in corruption research. They explain that “white collar crimes, including corruption, are
insufficiently prosecuted.” This is due to the fact that many states have ongoing strains on their
prosecutorial resources, which in turn means that states with better resources can be expected to
have more convictions and vice versa.55
The newspaper count was chosen as a measure to try and combat some of the
aforementioned problems that are inherent when using corruption rate. Even so, it comes with
problems. As addressed earlier, this dataset was limited by the amount of newspaper databases
that were used. This was not nearly as extensive of a search as the one conducted by Glaeser and
Goldin, but rather an attempt to offer another dataset to supplement the corruption rate in a way
that would address the concerns about this nature of data expressed in the research of Alt and
Lassen. Because of the aforementioned reasons, it makes it all the more interesting that every
independent variable except diversity produced a stronger correlation with the newspaper count
than it did for the corruption rate.
An important note on the newspaper count is that an alternate dataset was created to norm
the newspaper results to population data to create a newspaper result rate. Unlike the corruption
rate statistic however, the newspaper rate table returned results that came very close to ranking
states by their populations when this was attempted; the small states were all clustered near the
bottom of the newspaper count while the large states like New York and California all
congregated at the top.
The results reveal that the dependent variables that are commonly used to measure
corruption are imperfect. That is not to say that this work or conclusions drawn in this research
and previous research should be discounted, but rather it should be seen as an area that requires
James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, “Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from the
American States,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30, no.2, (May 2014): 310.
55

36

more attention from scholars in the future, especially in regard to statistical analyses on societal
factors that influence corruption.
Another problem could lie in the fact that the predictors of corruption were not measured
thoroughly enough, thus creating an imperfect dataset that was used with the regression analyses.
This would potentially explain why we did not see the same strong correlations in this research
as other scholars hypothesized. An alternative suggestion as to why the regression results were
lacking strength could be that the variables suffer from multicollinearity. If this is true, it would
mean that the low regression coefficients do not indicate that the variable did not have a
statistically significant relationship with corruption, but rather that the independent variables
were correlated closely with each other and subsequently took away from the strength of the
correlation in the regression.56
Conclusion
With the significant contributing factors of corruption identified, we can determine what
this data means for the state of Arkansas. In professionalism and income inequality scores,
Arkansas does not stand out. Ranked 25th in their level of legislative professionalism and 19th in
income inequality, these numbers are not exactly consistent with what the regression would
identify as a state that is likely to have large numbers of reported corruption cases. Arkansas was
actually below the national average in its legislative professionalism (0.207 compared to 0.229),
only slightly above the national average in its income inequality score (47.00 compared to
46.22), and both of these scores are within one standard deviation of the national average. When
this is taken into consideration, it is unsurprising that Arkansas’s raw scores for both of the
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reported corruption datasets do not set it apart either, also falling within one standard deviation
of the national averages for corruption rate and newspaper count.
With this, it would be hard to argue that Arkansas is as corrupt as some reports made in
its early history made it out to be, which could merely be attributed to modernization and the
passing of time. Far removed are we from the era of Arkansas politics when John Wilson and
Joseph J. Anthony dueled by deliberating in Little Rock and the era of the strong political
machines prosecuted by Lewis Rhoton. While there are still instances of misdeeds in state and
local politics within Arkansas’s borders, the data shows that the number of them in recent
memory do not seem to raise any red flags when compared to the rest of the country. What we
are left with is a sigh of relief, or perhaps the motivation to take a more targeted approach at
understanding the contributing factors of corruption and the effects that arise because of those.
As mentioned before, the study of what causes corruption in U.S. states is incomplete and
may never be fully understood due to the complex and ever-evolving nature of it. As with any
other crimes, criminals will adapt quickly to circumvent any measures put in place to prevent it.
Therefore, our best chance to prevent corruption and whether it be in Arkansas, the national
government, and any other government is to take a proactive approach and attempt to understand
the factors that correlate with higher reports of corruption and attempt to find solutions for those
factors rather than to attack corruption itself. It would be an unrealistic goal to get rid of
corruption completely, but by identifying the unique characteristics of the places in which it is
the most prevalent, we can take a smarter approach in making ourselves less vulnerable to
scandals and misdeeds in our governments.
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